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Dieser Beitrag wurde erstmals wie folgt veröffentlicht:  
Astrid Epiney, Sustainable Use of Freshwater Resources, Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 2003, S. 377-396. Es ist möglich, dass die 
Druckversion – die allein zitierfähig ist – im Verhältnis zu diesem Manuskript 
geringfügige Modifikationen enthält.  
I. Introduction 
 The issue of freshwater resources is an increasing problem: in many areas of the world people 
do not have access to clean and sufficient drinking water. This not only causes many diseases 
among the population but it is also – in certain regions of the world – one of the major risk factors 
in maintaining peace. Thus, the perspectives of sustainable use of freshwater are of great 
importance not only from an environmental point of view1. The sustainable use of freshwater 
resources often has an international dimension, since the use of such resources may concern 
several States. On the other hand, in a human rights law perspective, the aspect of internal 
access to freshwater also has a significant importance. Finally, it must be pointed out that the use 
of freshwater resources can have a great impact on future generations, and therefore also 
influences the "principle" of sustainable development. 
 The purpose of the following paper is not to deal in detail with the above mentioned issues. In 
this paper, I will try to evaluate the results of the Johannesburg Summit 2002 concerning the 
sustainable development of freshwater resources and to link it to the existing framework in 
international law2 (II.) before considering the possible perspectives (III.). The paper ends with a 
short conclusion (IV.). 
 The exact meaning of the term "sustainable use" of freshwater resources cannot be fully 
explored in this paper; for our purpose, this notion refers to a use which guarantees that the 
existing freshwater can be maintained in quantity and quality for future generations. This 
especially means that the existing natural freshwater coming from water sources should be 
maintained and managed in such a way that in quantity and quality the water can continue to be 
used as freshwater resources for people3. This approach does not only imply protecting 
measures but also managing measures in order to distribute the water resources in an 
appropriate way without damaging the availability of the resource itself.  
II. Overview and Evaluation of the Results at Johannesburg 
 The use of freshwater resources is principally stated in points 23 to 28 of the "plan of 
implementation" adopted at the summit. This document is a "soft law" instrument, which means 
that it does not and will not be binding in the strict sense of the term but contains, above all, 
declarations of intention. This does not mean that they are irrelevant, but rather that they describe 
a target to be reached with the means available rather than strict obligations for the States to act 
or not. As concerns the content of the points mentioned, we can distinguish between different 
general aspects, concerning partly the use of freshwater resources and partly the use of other 
natural resources4 (1.), financial aspects and technology transfer (2.), prevention of water 
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pollution (3.), introduction of an integrated water resource management (4.), and international co-
operation (5.). 
1 .  G e n e r a l  A s p e c t s  
 Two main points of the chapter related to sustainable use of freshwater resources (and partly 
to the use of other resources) may be stressed: the general target of the chapter (a) and the 
issues dealing with different aspects of "good governance" (b).  
A. The General Target 
 The goal of a sustainable use of freshwater resources figures essentially in point 24 of the 
implementation plan. As a result, the current trend in natural resource degradation should be 
reversed as soon as possible: ecosystems have to be protected and an integrated management 
of water resources has to be achieved. Furthermore, point 25 mentions the goal of safe drinking 
water and to halve, before 2015, the proportion of people who have no access to or cannot afford 
safe drinking water as well as the proportion of people with no access to basic sanitation.  
 In this context, the implementation plan has – at least in chapter IV which will be discussed 
later in this paper – a very anthropocentric perspective, in the sense that the protection of natural 
resources is regarded as a means to promote social and economic development. This general 
direction is already expressed in the title of the chapter "Protecting and managing the natural 
resource base of economic and social development" and reflected in several affirmations in the 
document. The accent is put on providing drinking water and water for the sanitary uses of people 
(point 24, in the beginning), an efficient use of water resources is affirmed, which should give 
priority to the satisfaction of basic human needs (point 25.c) and it is also mentioned that water 
pollution should be reduced in order to protect human health (point 24.d). It should not be denied 
that the management and the protection of natural resources, including freshwater resources, is a 
vital condition for human well being and development. Nevertheless, sustainable use and 
management of freshwater resources also require protection of water resources in the cases 
where their utility in promoting human well being does not exist or is less evident. Any other 
approach would not respect the interdependence of ecological systems.  
 The document – even if the accent seems to be put rather on aspects of utility – does not 
totally exclude such an approach. This is for example the case when the document refers to 
water pollution prevention in order to protect ecosystems (point 24.d) or when it is generally urged 
that prevention and protection measures should be adopted in order to promote sustainable water 
use and to address water shortages (point 24.e). But globally, the implementation plan stresses 
the needs of human beings, including aspects of industrial or agriculture needs for freshwater. 
Point 25.c) of the plan is especially clear on that point when it states that integrated water 
resources management plans should "improve the efficient use of water resources and promote 
their allocation among competing uses in a way that gives priority to the satisfaction of basic 
human needs and balances the requirement of preserving or restoring ecosystems and their 
functions (...) with human domestic, industrial and agriculture needs (...)".  
 It is not the place here to question the understanding of "sustainable development"5 which 
seems to be the background of this approach. Nevertheless, it may be underlined that the needs 
of human being as a main perspective is not always useful since this point of view can lead us to 
neglect aspects of water policy which are not directly related to human needs. In this perspective, 
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it may be – from a lawyer’s point of view – clearer if the concept of sustainable development is 
reduced to aspects of environmental protection whereas other interests could be taken into 
consideration as separate targets which should then be realised or balanced with environmental 
concerns. This approach does not give less importance to strictly social and economic issues but 
would allow a clearer definition of the goals of each policy and would thus clearly define the 
conflicts. On this basis, a balance of interests could assure a result which takes into account all 
relevant goals.  
B. Aspects of Good Governance 
 The second general aspect concerns what is generally called "good governance". The plan 
affirms that access to public information and participation in support and decision-making related 
to water resources management and project implementation should be guaranteed (point 24.b). 
Furthermore, several references are made to "capacity building" (point 24.a), 24.c), 25.e), 27.), 
and in point 25.g) it is stressed that public-private partnerships should be facilitated, a transparent 
national regulatory framework should be guaranteed and the performance and improving 
accountability of public institutions and private companies should be monitored. Point 25.b) calls 
upon a full employment of the range of policy instruments in order to achieve an integrated water 
resource management, and finally point 24.d) refers to the establishment of monitoring systems 
and on effective legal framework. 
 The target of good governance is often stressed, and the importance of the different aspects 
of good governance6 for the development of effective protection of natural resources cannot be 
denied. However, so far as the actual status of international law is concerned, obligations 
referring to concrete aspects of good governance are not really part of international law, except 
some very sectorial and limited aspects. Thus, the principle that an environmental impact 
assessment has to be made for projects, which cause considerable damage to the environment 
of other States, can be affirmed. But the requirements and procedural rules, which have to be 
applied in order to realise such an environmental assessment, have not yet been clearly defined 
in international law7. Furthermore, the Aarhus Convention has to be taken into account. This 
Convention states obligations in the field of access to environmental information, participation in 
deciding procedures and access to justice8. However, the Convention is for the moment limited to 
European States (it was elaborated in the framework of the ECE/UN Commission) and the rules 
figuring in the Convention are not part of (customary) general public international law.  
 Seen from this perspective, the results of the Johannesburg summit do not show any 
substantial progress, neither, so far as binding law is concerned, nor as new "soft law" postulates 
are concerned. The implementation plan is limited to relatively general affirmations without any 
precise definition of what is requested from the States.  
2 .  F i n a n c i a l  A s p e c t s  a n d  T e c h n o l o g y  T r a n s f e r  
 There are several references to financial assistance and technology transfer in the 
implementation plan, aspects that are related to the different economic capacities of the States. 
The realisation of these aspects is also, to a certain extent, a concretisation of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities.  
 Thus, international and domestic financial resources at all levels, as well as transfer 
technology should be mobilised (point 24.a) and new additional financial resources and 
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innovative technologies should be provided (point 24.c). Point 25.e) refers to supporting 
measures to developing countries in order to face water scarcity and point 25.f) calls upon 
technological, technical and financial assistance for different efforts for energy-efficient, 
sustainable and cost-effective desalination of seawater and different forms of water recycling. In 
general terms point 26 stresses the necessity to support developing countries in their efforts to 
monitor and assess the quantity and quality of water resources and point 27 refers in a large 
manner to technology transfer.  
 Altogether, the plan is limited to general calls to financial assistance and technology transfer in 
different fields; but there is no precise commitment of any State. In so far, the document does not 
really develop existing international law.  
3 .  P r e v e n t i o n  o f  W a t e r  P o l l u t i o n  
 The implementation plan refers in point 24.d) to prevention of water pollution in order to 
reduce health hazards and to protect ecosystems and also includes the protection of 
groundwater. Point 24.e) stresses the necessity of preventive and protection measures in order to 
promote sustainable water use and to address water shortages.  
 These targets are rather general, but it has to be noted that they do not refer to any 
transnational relationship. Until now, customary international law entails essentially obligations 
which are dependant on the implication of another State or its territory, such as the obligation not 
to cause harm on the environment of other States9 and the principle of equitable use of common 
resources. Obligations with respect to the national territory only are limited to the prohibition to 
cause massive pollution, and even this obligation is contested10. Also, the UN Convention of 
1997 on International Watercourses11 is in principle limited to international watercourses. 
However, this Convention also points out, in the preamble, that sustainable use of international 
watercourses in order to satisfy the needs of present and future generations should be attained12.  
4 .  T o w a r d s  a n  I n t e g r a t e d  W a t e r  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t  
 In several points, the implementation plan includes also an integrated perspective, in other 
words a perspective which is not limited to special measures in order to prevent a certain type of 
pollution but which should look at the water management from a holistic point of view13. The 
target of such an approach is to preserve and protect water resources as a whole and not just to 
fight against isolated pollution problems. Point 25 of the plan stresses the necessity of developing 
integrated water resource management, and in point 25.a), c) this target is reiterated and 
specified. Thus, national and regional strategies, plans and programmes should be developed 
and implemented with regard to integrated river basin and groundwater management and the 
efficient use of water resources and their allocation should be improved. It is worth noting that 
until now binding international instruments or obligations generally do not repose on an integrated 
approach but seem to privilege a rather isolated approach, especially as concerns the obligation 
not to cause harm to other States.  
5 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o - o p e r a t i o n   
 Finally, point 28 of the implementation plan refers to the necessity of effective co-ordination 
among the international and intergovernmental bodies as well as the integration of the "civil 
society" in this co-ordination. This approach goes beyond the traditional obligation to cooperate 
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which exists between States14. But it has to be noted that the extent and content of such co-
operation remain rather unclear. 
III. Perspectives in View of Sustainable Use of Freshwater Resources 
1 .  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  P l a n  
 If one tries to evaluate the results at Johannesburg in relation to the target of sustainable use 
of freshwater resources, one has to note that different aspects are taken into consideration, which 
touch essential aspects of sustainable use of water. Some of these aspects are: especially the 
necessity of financial and technology transfer, the necessity of the adoption of an integrated 
approach, different aspects of good governance and the insertion of merely "internal" 
environmental problems. The points included in the implementation plan are formulated in a very 
general way so that it is impossible to deduce any concrete commitment for States. However, in 
view of diminishing the number of individuals who have no access to sufficient freshwater, a 
concrete target (halving the number of these persons) is mentioned. Furthermore, the document 
does not solve the problem of the relationship between water protection and economic 
development. Some provisions point out the necessity to protect ecosystems, other formulations 
seem to allow rather fargoing infringements of natural resources in order to pursue economic and 
social targets without defining any criteria where the limits have to be drawn. Altogether, and 
without ignoring the importance of some aspects included in the document, such as for example 
the fact that purely internal aspects are considered or that the importance of technical and 
financial assistance is stressed, the Johannesburg result cannot, as such, constitute a sufficient 
starting point for a sustainable use of freshwater resources, and this for at least four reasons:  
 - the goal is not formulated in a sufficiently precise manner; 
 - the commitments are too vague, as far as the traditional pollution and the concept of 
integrated protection are concerned; also the extent of financial and technical assistance is not 
really defined and the above mentioned international co-operation is formulated in very general 
terms; 
 - the role of individual rights is not stressed; in fact, the experience in the field of human rights 
shows that the guarantee of individual rights can often strengthen the respect of international 
commitments; 
 - and finally, the extent of obligations related to a state's own territory remains undefined.  
2 .  M a i n  O b s t a c l e s  t o  a  S u s t a i n a b l e  U s e  o f  F r e s h w a t e r  R e s o u r c e s   
 Before asking how to improve the legal framework for a sustainable use of freshwater 
resources, one has to ask about the main obstacles on the way to a sustainable use of water 
resources. However, the following remarks are limited to the legal framework. Three aspects 
seem particularly important against the background of the considerations above: 
 - First of all, the target needs to be defined more clearly. It is not possible in the present paper 
to explore the notion of "sustainability" or "sustainable development"15. But it can be stressed that 
a general "balancing" between the interest of protection of ecosystems on the one hand, and 
social and economic development on the other hand, is dangerous in the view of the effective 
consideration of the interests of future generations. Indeed, if you satisfy some human needs in 
the present, this can lead to the impossibility to maintain a functioning ecosystem in the future. 
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So, sustainability should be specified in the sense that the environment should not be used or 
degraded in a way that the needs of future generations cannot be fulfilled any more. In this 
perspective, sustainability means also to maintain or guarantee a certain standard which can in 
principle not be relativised by other concerns. However, it is also evident that progress in other 
policy fields is a necessary condition for implementing sustainability. Thus, poverty and low social 
development are very serious enemies of sustainable development, and sustainability can only 
be realised if an adequate social and economic development is guaranteed. However, from a 
legal perspective, this incontestable link between the implementation of sustainability and 
progress in certain policy areas does not mean that the concept of sustainability itself should be 
altered but rather that the realisation of its objectives should also take place in the field of these 
policy areas. This also means – as the implementation plan puts forward – sufficient technical 
and financial assistance from the "developed" countries to the "developing" countries. In order to 
emphasise the meaning of sustainability in that context, it would be desirable if this connection 
could be pointed out in a clearer way than the way it is defined now.  
 - Secondly, it is desirable that States and international organisations – in co-operation with 
non-governmental organisations – develop commitments for the States in a more accurate way. 
On the one hand, one can think of material commitments such as: reduction of certain polluting 
substances, obligation to clean water, interdiction to dispose clearly defined dangerous 
substances in the water and groundwater, etc., as well as procedural commitments such as: 
participation of the public, access to justice, environmental impact assessment for all dangerous 
projects, etc., on the other hand. 
 - Thirdly, the exact relationship between territorial sovereignty and obligations related to the 
management of natural resources is not yet clearly established, neither in theory nor in concrete 
commitments. Therefore, States have generally the tendency to insist on their territorial 
sovereignty without acknowledging any obligation related to the use or management of natural 
resources.  
3 .  P e r s p e c t i v e s  
 Some of the above mentioned obstacles require certain developments in international law. It is 
now idle to speculate if such developments can be expected in the next years. But the results of 
Johannesburg and the rather slow development of international environmental law during the last 
decade do not seem to indicate important developments so that one should not be too optimistic 
on this point.  
 However, irrespective of possible developments in the future, one can ask if some legal 
developments or legal principles already exist. These developments or principles could be of a 
certain importance in relation to a sustainable use of freshwater resources, especially those 
which could be developed in the sense of a recognition of legal principles contributing to a 
sustainable use of freshwater resources. In fact, two aspects seem to be important: first, the 
question if and to what extent human rights can contribute to a sustainable use of freshwater 
resources (a) and second, the question how – from a legal perspective – the concept of territorial 
sovereignty can be reconciled with the idea of sustainable use of freshwater resources (b). Even 
if – as will be shown below – there are some indications in that sense, it has to be mentioned that 
the following remarks concern mainly perspectives which would have to be developed further in 
international law and practice.  
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 It has also to be noted that for the development of the following considerations the principle of 
sustainable development is important. It has been mentioned above16 that the content of this 
principle should – contrary to the dominating view in international law and practice – be limited to 
environmental considerations excluding economic and social belongs. These should be taken into 
consideration in the framework of "independent" principles and so in balancing different interests 
respectively principles. From a legal point of view, the "obligation" to tend towards sustainable 
development can be regarded as a "principle" of international law with a certain legal value. This 
paper is not the place to discuss the necessity of principles in international law and their possible 
meaning17; however, it can be pointed out that in international law and especially in international 
environmental law different "principles" have been developed in practice. They distinguish 
themselves from rules in the way that they do not yet contain precise obligations of behaviour for 
States. They are formulated in a too general way or their content tends to seek merely general 
targets. As a result, it is not possible to argue that a certain State behaviour is in contrast with 
such a principle. The point of view defended in this paper is that you can distinguish in 
international environmental law between such principles – which are as such not really 
operational – and rules – which contain more precise obligations for States to do or not to do 
something18. However, the exact legal meaning and value of such principles, binding as 
customary or international law, is often not clear. Under this condition, they must be taken into 
consideration when interpreting and applying international rules, and thus, to this extent, will be 
considered as indirect guiding principles for States behaviour. Furthermore, they influence the 
development of international customary and treaty law19. Nevertheless, a principle can only have 
such a legal value if its content can be defined to a certain extent which is often difficult20. As 
concerns the principle of sustainable development, it can be – if interpreted in the mentioned 
restrictive way – regarded as such a principle for two reasons. First, its meaning can – to a 
certain extent – be specified; and second, international law and practice refer to this principle in 
such a way that it seems obvious that it should have a legal value in the sense that it has to be 
taken into consideration when interpreting and applying international law21. 
A. A Propos the Human Rights Dimension of Water Use 
 Even if the dimension of sustainable use of water resources has to be separated from other 
political or legal goals (like social and economic development), there are numerous links between 
the realisation of sustainability and the implementation of citizen's rights in other fields. Thus, the 
existence and reliance of rights in other fields can help to promote, as a sort of secondary effect, 
sustainable development. It means that the possible human right to fresh drinking water can or 
could contribute to the realisation of a sustainable water use and indirectly oblige the State to 
take measures in favour of a sustainable development, at least in that field. In this context, two 
problems can be distinguished: the existence and meaning of an individual right to "water use" (a) 
and the relationship of this right with a sustainable use of freshwater resources (b).  
 As already mentioned above22, the following considerations do not pretend to reflect existing 
and recognised international law. So, it should be pointed out that until now a "right to sufficient 
drinking water" is not recognised in international practice23, and this is the case even if, in recent 
years, some commentaries are going in this direction. The aim of the following considerations is 
therefore to demonstrate that the recognition of such a right would fit very well in the international 
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system of human rights and sometimes is even a necessary condition for the effectiveness of 
some of them.  
a )  E x i s t e n c e  a n d  E x t e n t  o f  a  R i g h t  t o  " W a t e r  U s e "  
 The question which arises in this context concerns the existence of human rights which confer 
to the concerned persons the right to claim a sufficient provision of drinking water24. In the 
relevant international treaties on human rights, there are above all two provisions in the 
Covenants of 196625 which could confer such a right: 
 - Art. 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that every human being has the 
inherent right to life. Since the access to water resources is a necessary condition to life, one 
could deduce from this provision that all people have a right of access to fresh water and/or that 
the State has to take the necessary measures in order to preserve sufficient freshwater resources 
in general. As a result this presupposes a sustainable water resource management.  
 - Art. 11 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises the right of 
everyone "to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food". 
Access to water resources is part of an "adequate standard of living" and water is also considered 
as an element of the necessary nutrition. In this context the question of the existence of a right to 
access to water resources and of an obligation of States to procure sufficient water resources can 
also be raised.  
 On the one hand, the application of both provisions to our topic raises the controversial and 
classical question as to whether and to which extent human rights can oblige States to take 
affirmative actions, so that the traditional aspect of human rights as rights to ask the State to 
refrain from certain actions (Abwehrrechte) would be completed by certain rights to positive 
measures (Leistungspflichten). On the other hand, one can ask if the effective protection of 
human rights do require from the State certain measures to guarantee that the respect or 
realisation of human rights is not endangered by other persons and/or general life conditions 
(Schutzpflichten). It has to be pointed out that the "Schutzpflichten" are in reality part of the 
"Leistungspflichten" since they presuppose also a certain action of the State, in the sense that the 
State has to prevent that human rights are violated by other private persons.  
 It is not the subject of this paper to deal with these fundamental issues of human rights 
doctrine. Thus, I will rather take as a starting point the principle that the obligation to take 
affirmative actions can be a meaning of human rights, then explore the possible meaning of these 
guarantees and finally try to concretise their meaning in relation to our topic: 
 - First of all, it seems now to be widely recognised that human rights guarantees can, in 
principle, oblige States also to take positive measures in favour of individuals26. The labelling of 
many human rights provisions already supports this point of view. Over and above this, the 
effective guarantee and realisation of a couple of human rights require different types of 
behaviour from States. Generally, an abstention of the State to do something is necessary to 
protect the human right. Second, the State may be called to prevent private persons to violate a 
human right, and third, in numerous cases, a real "doing" from the State to individuals is 
necessary.  
 - So, the real question is not if – in principle – States can be obliged to take affirmative actions, 
but which human rights confer such obligations and what is their concrete meaning. Three 
aspects are important in this context27 and they can be pointed out independently of concrete 
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rights. Nevertheless, it is evident that only the analysis of concrete dispositions allows to 
formulate an exact meaning of these obligations. First, such obligations can generally be fulfilled 
in various manners so that it is often not possible to specify in a concrete way the required State 
action, as the States dispose of a certain discretion. As a result, obligations to take positive 
measures are often not very accurate so that only an evident refusal to act as requested can be 
regarded as a violation. Second, obligations to take positive measures are generally formulated in 
such a way that States are only under an obligation to take the necessary measures as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible in order to achieve the goal28. In practice, it is often the 
case that States cannot realise – from an economic or a factual point of view – the objectives 
formulated by the human rights obligation. As a result, obligations to take positive measures often 
state only duties to use all the possible means to reach the target. However, this does not 
necessarily mean a general exception for economic difficulties. Such a point of view would not be 
in conformity with general international law. But as long as the human rights obligations refer to 
such a meaning, economic difficulties can be taken into consideration29. Third, there are 
exceptions to the limits of the meaning of obligations to adopt positive measures. Sometimes, the 
result to be reached is clearly enough formulated so that it is possible to specify the content of 
the obligation. Furthermore, there are human rights obligations that stipulate a minimal standard, 
which may not be fell short. Under these conditions, human rights can be regarded as obligations 
to attain a certain result30. So, in relation to the most social and economic rights, a sort of 
"minimal core content" can be formulated. In other words, if the minimal rights are not fulfilled, this 
can be considered as a violation of the human rights, and States are under the direct obligation to 
take the necessary measures to fulfil these rights. However, international obligations are not 
violated if one of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness is fulfilled, such as, for example, 
force majeure or distress31. Nowadays, this concept seems to be recognised in principle32, and 
also the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopts this approach33. It is also a 
necessary consequence in order to give some effectiveness to certain social and economic 
rights. In other words, their character as legal obligations implies that it is possible to deduce a 
sort of minimal obligations for the State, otherwise these guarantees would be reduced to pure 
objectives and as such they could not deploy any real effect. However, it is to be noted that such 
obligations on the State do not mean that States have to confer to individuals real individual, 
"subjective" rights in the sense that they can be claimed in court. The manner how States fulfil 
their international obligations is in their competence and even the minimum core content is very 
often not precise enough for the formulation of an individual right34.  
 - If one tries now to apply this approach to our issue, the question is whether and to what 
extent such a minimal core content can be deduced from Art. 6 of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Art. 11 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. If one takes 
seriously the presented approach of a minimal core content of some economic and social rights, 
in other words, if the concept of minimal core content does make any sense, these two articles – 
and especially, in our context, the second one – must contain such a minimal standard, at least 
as access to a living minimum of freshwater is concerned: These obligations are sufficiently 
precise as the necessary means for human beings to survive is concerned. They would be 
deprived from every effectiveness if they did not confer a right to the minimal needs necessary in 
order to survive (right to life and right to food)35. Since a minimum quantity of freshwater is 
necessary to survive36, one can deduce from these articles an obligation for the States to take 
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the necessary steps to guarantee a sufficient access to freshwater resources. So, if a very 
significant number of individuals is deprived of such an access, the territorial State normally fails 
to discharge its obligations under these articles. Nevertheless, in every single case, there must be 
examined if some circumstances precluding wrongfulness are fulfilled, which can probably be 
admitted in cases of factual impossibility. Furthermore, it has to be stressed that States dispose 
over a certain discretion as to the manner they use to fulfil this obligation. In other words, it would 
generally be very difficult to deduce from the cited obligation an obligation of the States to take 
one precise measure.  
b )  R e l e v a n c e  f o r  t h e  S u s t a i n a b l e  U s e  o f  F r e s h w a t e r  R e s o u r c e s  
 If, actually, one tries to link the human rights obligation of States to take the necessary steps in 
order to provide access to a minimum quantity of freshwater to individuals on the one side, with 
the guarantee of a sustainable use of freshwater resources on the other side, one has to start 
with the assumption that States are, in principle, free to decide how they want to fulfil this 
obligation. As a result, it could be difficult to deduce, from the above mentioned concept of 
minimal core content, an obligation to look for a sustainable use of freshwater resources. It may 
be possible that people have access to sufficient freshwater resources even if principles of 
sustainable use of freshwater resources are not respected.  
 However, this point of view does not address adequately the principle of sustainable 
development which has a certain legal effect37. Therefore, this principle should be especially 
taken into account when interpreting international obligations – even if it remains an unprecise 
one. If this concept also means that the perspective of future generations should be taken into 
consideration, in the way that their interests will have in principle the same value as the interests 
of the present generations, the right to access to sufficient freshwater resources, as deduced 
from Art. 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Art. 11 of the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and further the obligation of States to take all necessary measures in 
order to guarantee such an access, should not be interpreted in a manner which could undermine 
the needs of future generations. If the needs of the present generation to have access to 
sufficient freshwater resources are now satisfied in a way which clearly does not respect 
principles of sustainable use of freshwater resources, then the needs of future generations are or 
could be compromised. In that sense, States are under the obligation, entailed in the above 
mentioned provisions, to respect a minimum standard of sustainable use of freshwater resources 
when fulfilling the needs of access to such freshwater resources.  
 In these limits, States are thus obliged to realise the minimum core content of the cited articles 
in respecting principles of sustainable use of freshwater resources. But, as the States discretion 
in realising this target is very large, a State's act can be considered as a violation of this 
obligation only in case of patent non respect of the principles of sustainability, such as for 
example: the use of the water of a lake in a way which results in the draining of the lake or at 
least in a considerable and stable reduction of water quantity and/or quality. Besides, this 
obligation is not an "independent" obligation to apply principles of sustainable use of freshwater 
but it is one of the elements of the right to have access to sufficient freshwater or of the obligation 
to take all necessary measures to attain this target.  
B  O n  t h e  W a y  t o  a  L i m i t e d  C o n c e p t  o f  T e r r i t o r i a l  S o v e r e i g n t y ( ? )  
 11
 One of the main problems in realising a sustainable use of freshwater resources is, in fact, the 
principle of territorial sovereignty as this concept has developed historically. It now means that all 
resources situated in the territory of a State are at the free disposition of that State unless rules of 
public international law limit the way to dispose of specific natural resources. These limits occur 
over and above all under the condition that the territory of another State is seriously affected. As 
the use of freshwater resources is concerned, the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation of common water resources – which is also included in international conventions – is 
particularly important38. One can also mention the obligation not to cause considerable harm to 
the territory of another State39. When natural resources are used in a way that does not hinder 
possible utilisations by other States, there are generally – at least so far as water resources are 
concerned – no international obligations involved, even if the utilisation does not respect 
principles of sustainable use40. The concept of sustainable development does not change this 
conclusion since it cannot be applied as such and one cannot deduce just from this principle 
rights and obligations from States. However, it is evident that this "traditional" concept of territorial 
sovereignty does not contribute to oblige States to apply principles of sustainable use. On the 
contrary; it is inherent to this system that even the development of concrete international rules is 
rather hindered by this concept.  
 This statement leads to the question as to whether it would be possible to develop the 
mentioned principle of "total" territorial sovereignty in a sense allowing, under certain conditions, 
to deduce from principles of international law some limits for the exercice of territorial sovereignty. 
A starting point could be the well known judgement of Max H u b e r  in the Palmas Case41 where 
he pointed out – in relation to the "traditional" meaning of territorial sovereignty – the following 
principles: "Territorial sovereignty (...) involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a 
State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of 
other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with 
the rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory"42.  
 The background of Max H u b e r ' s  analysis is the fact that territorial sovereignty certainly 
gives the right to States to use their territory as they understand it; but this concept reaches its 
limits when certain types of use of the territory endanger rights of other States or common goods. 
In these cases, the exclusive exercice of power in a territory does not make any sense anymore 
since the consequences of the action go beyond the pure utilisation of the territory. It is clear that 
at the time when the Palmas judgement was pronounced, the rights of other States were the 
center of the preoccupations of such "corollary duties", so that the aspect of use of the territory in 
a manner that does not respect the territorial integrity of another State was the only or at least the 
main possible application of this idea; no one thought of environmental problems or issues related 
to sustainable use of resources. However, with the development of the concept of common 
concern of mankind43 and of the principle of sustainable development, one can ask if this idea of 
"corollary duties" can also apply to other issues, more concretely if the rights entailed in the 
principle of territorial sovereignty have to be limited in the sense that territorial sovereignty can 
never be the ground for applying non sustainable use of resources, especially water resources. 
This question can definitively be answered by the affirmative. The idea of Max H u b e r  that 
territorial sovereignty should not confer rights which affect other internationally recognized 
interests, principles or "Rechtsgüter" can well be applied to the sustainable use of (water) 
resources: since a non-sustainable use would compromise the interests of future generations 
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and, because of the interdependence of ecosystems, could as well deploy negative effects on the 
ecological equilibrium. The right to do what seems to be good for the State on its territory then 
finds its limits when the sustainable management of resources is touched44. In that sense, the 
respect of sustainable use of (water) resources is – as expressed in principle by Max H u b e r  – a 
corollary of the territorial sovereignty which is, to that extent, limited.  
 However, the principle of sustainability, also in this context, is not clearly defined, therefore 
giving States a large power of discretion. Nevertheless, it seems that at least in the field of 
freshwater resources, its meaning can be concreted to a certain extent, over and above all in 
applying principles developed in relation with the principle of equitable and reasonable use of 
water resources and the obligation not to cause harm to the environment of other States45. Even 
if these obligations refer in reality to transboundary relationships, two main ideas developed in the 
context of their application can be underlined for our purposes. The starting point will be that the 
target of sustainable use of freshwater resources should not be damaged more than the 
environment of other States: First, no serious harm (resulting from one or several sources) should 
be caused to freshwater resources, strong pollution "automatically" affecting the principle of 
sustainable use46; second the aspect of the realisation of sustainable use of freshwater resources 
has to be taken into "equitable consideration"47 which also means, in accordance with the 
principles formulated in the 1997 Convention48, that the freshwater resources have to be 
managed by taking into consideration aspects of sustainable development which presupposes an 
integrated management49, an approach which is also mentioned in the Johannesburg 
documents. Thus, it is imaginable that a State conduct does clearly not respect the limit of 
sustainability of managing water resources in using its territory. Such a limitation of territorial 
sovereignty means that the State itself has to avoid activities which are contrary to the principles 
of sustainable use of freshwater; and the State has to take all necessary measures in order to 
realise such a sustainable management, which implies positive measures, including measures 
adressed to private persons. Even if – as pointed out – in some clear situations, a violation of 
these principles can be envisaged, the main importance of such a limitation of territorial 
sovereignty would be – as the principle of sustainable development itself – the existence of a 
guiding line in the interpretation of existing international rules and in the development of new 
rules.  
 In any case, it has to be conceded that these thoughts do not (yet?) figure among the 
recognised principles of international law, even if they – as shown above – could very well fit in 
the concept of territorial sovereignty, as it has to be developed50.  
IV. Conclusion 
 If one tries to evaluate the actual results of "Johannesburg" in the light of the above-mentioned 
perspectives, at least three remarks can be made: 
 - First of all, it has to be noted that the human rights dimension refers to the dimension 
expressed in a relatively concrete way in the document: until 2015, the number of people not 
having access to sufficient drinking water should be halved, even if the question concerning the 
other half remains. 
 - The general targets, as far as the sustainable water use is concerned, do not rely on 
territorial aspects that could be interpreted in the sense of a certain limited territorial sovereignty. 
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Indeed, the need to implement a sustainable use of freshwater also within the territories of the 
States seems to be recognised.  
 - Finally, the "Johannesburg results" refer to an integrated management of freshwater 
resources which is certainly a necessary condition of sustainable use of freshwater resources.  
 However, the decisive steps in order to implement concretely these targets formulated in a 
very general way, have yet to be taken. In this context, "Johannesburg" can only be the beginning 
of a large "prise de conscience" which should be concreted in precise concepts and obligations, 
not only including material obligations for each State to realise the necessary means on the way 
towards a sustainable use of fresh water, but also obligations for developed countries to transfer 
technology and undertake capacity building measures. Besides, the target of sustainable use of 
freshwater should be formulated in a more precise way if one does not want to risk a relativisation 
of the aim to safeguard freshwater resources for future generations. Considered from this point of 
view, the results of "Johannesburg" may show the principal direction in which international law 
needs to be developed if one really wants to implement a sustainable use of fresh water 
resources. However, further steps in positive international law have to be made, and two points 
could be especially promising, as shown above: the human rights dimension and a certain 
change in the concept of territorial sovereignty. # 
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1996, 373 (379); very fargoing Alexandre K i s s , Towards the Codification of International 
Environmental Law, in: Hubert Bocken/Donatienne Ryckbost (ed.), Codification of Environmental Law, 
1996, 167 (171 et seq.); Colleen P. G r a f f y , Water, Water Everywhere, Nor any Drop to Drink: The 
Urgency of Transnational Solutions to International Riperian Disputes, Georgetown International 
Environmental LR 1988, 399 et seq.; in the same direction probably Jutta B r u n n é e , "Common 
Interest" – Echoes from an Empty Shell?, ZaöRV 1988, 791 et seq.; see also Art. 11 of the IUCN draft 
on International Covenant on Environment and Development, in: Hubert Bocken/Donatienne Ryckbost 
(ed.), Codification of Environmental Law, 1996, 183 et seq. However, it has to be conceded that State 
practice does not allow the conclusion that such an obligation is generally recognized, except of 
actions which concern the State Community as such. Cf. E p i n e y / S c h e y l i  (note 2), 116 et seq.; 
O d e n d a h l  (note 38), 292 et seq. 
 41 RIAA II, 829. 
 42 RIAA II, 829 (839).  
 43 This concept expresses the idea that at least certain aspects of environmental protection are of a 
general concern of all States. However, at the actual state of international environmental law, it is not 
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possible to deduce precise obligations from this concept. It can deploy a certain importance as the 
structure of international obligations is concerned (who can prevail on obligations?). Cf. Art. 3 IUCN 
Draft Covenant on Environment and Development or the preamble of the Climate Convention. Cf. to 
this concept Frank B i e r m a n n , "Common Concern of Humankind": The Emergence of a New 
Concept of International Environmental Law, ArchVR 1996, 426 et seq.; the idea of common heritage 
of mankind applies at the actual state of international law only to areas which are not within a State 
territory, cf. to this concept and its legal consequences respectively meanings O d e n d a h l  (note 38), 
252 et seq.; Ronald St. J. M a c D o n a l d , The Common Heritage of Mankind, FS Rudolf Bernhardt, 
1995, 153 et seq.; see also Wilhelm A. K e w e n i g , Common Heritage of Mankind – politischer 
Slogan oder Schlüsselbegriff?, FS Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, 1981, 385 et seq. 
 44 So in that sense, sustainable development can modify the concept of exclusive territorial 
sovereignty by making clear "that nations have primary but not exclusive control over resource 
decisions with extraterritorial impacts and that nations owe duties to the international community". Cf. 
A. D a n  T a r l o c k , Exclusive Sovereignty versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: 
The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, Tex. Int'L.J. 1997, 44 (65). 
 45 Cf. to these obligations references in note 9 and 38. 
 46 Cf. also in this direction K o k o t t  (note 3), 177 (201).  
 47 The criteria developed in the context of the principle of equitable and reasonable use can also be 
stressed in this context. Cf. the list in Art. 6 of the UN Convention of 1997 on International 
Watercourses. Cf. to these criteria Ximena F u e n t e s , The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization of 
International Rivers, BYIL 1996, 337 et seq.; see also O d e n d a h l  (note 38), 177 et seq.; Gerhard 
H a f n e r , The Optimum Utilization Principle and the Non-Navigational Uses of Draining Basins, AJPIL 
1993, 113 (119 et seq.); Charles B. B o u r n e , The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in 
the 1997 Watercourses Convention, CYIL 1997, 215 et seq.; Art. 7 of the "Helsinki Rules", ILA Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers of 1966, in: Harald Hohmann, Basic 
Documents of International Environmental Law (3 Volumes), 1992, vol. 1, 227 et seq. 
 48 Cf. art. 24 II lit. a) of the Convention.  
 49 Cf. in reference to the 1997 Convention K o k o t t  (note 3), 177 (202 et seq.). 
 50 See also the ideas going in a similar direction expressed by O d e n d a h l  (note 38), 360 et seq., 
who postulates an "Umweltpflichtigkeit" of sovereignty; P e r r e z  (note 21), 243 et seq. who 
understands sovereignty (also) as a responsibility. 
